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A GALLERY OF GARDNER

Board of Editors
Santa Clara Law Review*
INTRODUCTION

It is a curious misfortune that the bulk of legal literature
is humorless and turgid in style. It is especially curious in light
of the fact that the realm of legal ideas continues to be absorbing and provocative. Yet, when members of the legal profession, judges and lawyers alike, take up their pens, it is often
with a singular lack of imagination. Their desire to be profound
and dignified constrains their manner of expression to a stiff'
and lifeless form. Indeed, legal writing commands the attention
of few: most commonly diligent academics or law students assigned the wearisome material.
This article focuses attention on a radiant exception to the
tedium of most legal writing. His name is Justice Robert Gardner, Presiding Judge of the California Court of Appeal, 4th
District. He combines flash of wit with unbridled candor
of emotion, creating vibrant and readable opinions. It is not
enough to simply eulogize Gardner's incomparable style.
Rather, his own words uniquely demonstrate that legal writing
can enliven the spirit of the law. The following is an anthology
excerpted from some of Gardner's appellate decisions. It represents a vast array of topics that he has artfully explored with
clever charm and wit. Since Justice Gardner's writing speaks
eloquently for itself, the editor's comments will be minimal.
It seems fitting to introduce Gardner's buoyant style with
some of his own lamentations concerning the uninspired word:
It is a sad commentary on contemporary culture to
compare "Don't say a word, don't say a mother-fucking
word" with "Stand and deliver," the famous salutation of
Dick Turpin and other early English highwaymen. It is
true that both salutations lead to robbery. However, there
is a certain rich style to "Stand and deliver." On the other
hand, "Don't say a word, don't say a mother-fucking
word" conveys only dismal vulgarity.
© 1979 by the Board of Editors of the Santa Clara Law Review.
* This anthology was researched and written by dd Amantea, Associate Editor.
Additional research and coordination by Donald Allen, Associate Editor.
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The speech of the contemporary criminal culture has
always been a rich source of color and vitality to any language. Yet, when one compares the "bawds,"
"strumpets," "trulls," "cutpurses," "knaves," and
"rascals" of Fielding and Smollet to the "hookers,"
"pimps," "narcs," "junkies," and "snitches" of today's
criminal argot, one wonders just which direction we are
traveling civilization's ladder. "Hooker," at least, has
traceable historical antecedents- although the descendants of General "Fighting Joe" Hooker would probably
prefer that their famous ancestor be remembered for something other than his army's camp followers-such as the
slaughter at Chancellorsville.'
COMMENTARY ON LAW AND HUMANITY

Public Defenders Can Never Win
In People v. Huffman, Gardner takes a didactic hand in
criminal defendant jargon. The defendant was convicted of forcible rape on the basis of overwhelming direct evidence. On
appeal he contended that the public defender did not provide
him with effective assistance of counsel. In his own words, defendant complained that the public defender "keeps claiming
and trying to claim guilty. He keeps saying he can't get a
defense going. I thought the man was a lawyer. I need a lawyer
not a dump truck." At this juncture in the record, Gardner
footnotes wryly:
For the benefit of the uninitiated, "dump truck" is a
term commonly used by criminal defendants when complaining about the public defender. The origins of the
phrase are somewhat obscure. However, it probably means
that in the eyes of the defendant the public defender is
simply trying to dump him rather than afford him a vigorous defense. It is an odd phenomenon familiar to all trial
judges who handle arraignment calendars that some criminal defendants have a deep distrust for the public defender. This erupts from time to time in savage abuse to
these long-suffering but dedicated lawyers. It is almost a
truism that a criminal defendant would rather have the
most inept private counsel than the most skilled and capable public defender. Often the arraigning judge appoints
the public defender only to watch in silent horror as the
1. People v. Benton, 77 Cal. App. 3d 322, 324 n.1, 142 Cal. Rptr. 545, 546 n.1
(1978).
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defendant's family, having hocked the family jewels, hire
a lawyer for him, sometimes a marginal misfit who is allowed to represent him only because of some ghastly mistake on the part of the Bar Examiners and the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Smith v. Superior Court...2
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The complaint of ineffective assistance of counsel is frequently raised on appeal. Appellate counsel often present this
issue at the insistence of the client irrespective of his or her own
professional judgment and common sense. This practice is
enormously disconcerting to Gardner:
[T]hese attacks on trial counsel continue with monotonous regularity. It is understandable that the individual
defendant, faced with unpleasant consequences of his own
irresponsible behavior and being affected with man's notorious reluctance to admit error or to face up to his own
mistake, will strike out blindly at all who had anything to
do with his predicament-witnesses, victims, judges, prosecutors, jurors, the whole law enforcement and judicial
process-and, unfortunately, his own attorney. However,
the frequency with which appellate counsel present this
issue is distressing. After all, appellate counsel is blessed
with the gift of hindsight as he leisurely picks over the
carcass of a dead lawsuit. He is not confronted with the
minute to minute and second to second strategic and tactical decisions which must be made by the trial lawyer during the heat of battle. There is nothing in Smith . . . or
Feggans. . . which says that an appellate attorney should
abdicate his responsibilities as a professional man and become the lackey of his client. It is the lawyer, not the
client, who after a review of the record, chooses the issues.
Doctors do not allow patients to diagnose their own ailments, and self-help brain surgery is quite rare. Just because a convicted defendant is unhappy with his trial representation does not mean that counsel on appeal must
maintain a full scale attack of trial counsel. If, in his study
of the record, it is appellate counsel's professional opinion
that trial counsel did all that could reasonably be expected
and that his representation did not deprive a defendant of
a viable defense or reduce the trial to a farce or a sham,
there is no compulsion on appellate counsel to carry out his
2.
(1977).

People v. Huffman, 71 Cal. App. 3d 63, 70 n.2, 139 Cal. Rptr. 264, 267 n.2
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client's perhaps capricious whims by presenting issues
which to him, from an objective professional viewpoint,
lack merit.3
Later in the same opinion, Gardner highlights the deceptive
impact that hindsight may have on a trial court record:
Turning to the instant case, we observe that while
trial lawyers come in all shapes and sizes and no two trial
lawyers are identical in style, they fall, generally, into two
categories.
The first category files every conceivable motion and
presents issues ad nauseam. This attorney slows down the
wheels of the administration of justice, exasperates trial
judges, and bores and often succeeds in confusing juries.
He does everything "by the book" and his win-loss ratio
usually leaves much to be desired. On appeal, it must be
conceded that he has made a good record. No stone has
been left unturned. Of course, he lost his case but he has
made a dandy record. It would appear from the contents
of the brief filed in this case that appellate counsel is an
admirer of this school of trial attorneys.
The second category of trial attorneys is usually much
more effective. He has the capacity for reducing issues to
simple terms. He is as miserly with motions, objections
and issues as an Ernest Hemingway with words or a Louis
Armstrong with musical notes. He has an instinct for the
jugular, an ability to explore the meritorious and to ignore
the trivial, a capacity for keeping issues understandable,
a high respect for the intelligence of the jury, and by reason
of all this is usually as effective as the attorney in the first
category is ineffective. Of course, to the nitpicker, his record on appeal leaves much to be desired since he has not
pressed every motion or made every possible objection, nor
has he presented issues which in his professional judgment
4
were a waste of time.
So perturbed is Gardner by the regularity of attacks on trial
counsel that he includes in the opinion this ominous caveat:
History tells us that for years Cato ended every speech
on every subject with Delenda est Carthago-"Carthage
must be destroyed." Eventually, Carthage was destroyed,
and since Cato was quite an active speaker one wonders
3.
(1974).
4.

People v. Eckstrom, 43 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1001-02, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391, 394-95
Id. at 1002-03, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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just how much credit must be afforded him for his mindnumbing, metronome-like program of hate. More recently,
an unsavory creature named Joseph Goebbels conceived
the Big Lie-a concept by which an untruth repeated often
enough and loud enough becomes, in the mind of the listener, the truth. So, too, a program of persistent and consistent attacks on the competency of trial counsel, even
though such attacks are usually unwarranted, cannot but
have a deleterious effect on the legal profession.5
The Role of the Jury in the Judicial System
As should already be obvious, Gardner tackles every subject with refreshing candor and high-principled spirit. He never
balks at the hard dilemma nor cowers from an unpopular position. Indeed, he has made a strong commitment to the promotion of active intelligence in the judicial process. His most salient comments in this regard are directed to the role of the jury.
Gardner holds the jury in the highest esteem as a vital cog
in the wheel of justice. He is disturbed by the paternalistic and
condescending posture taken by the legal profession as well as
by the outmoded rules of evidence that together demean the
integrity of the jury. The following excerpts provide some
trenchant remarks:
This case represents a classic reflection of an attitude of'
the courts toward the rules of evidence which I find to be
completely out of step with the facts of life as they exist
today.
Too much of the law of evidence has its roots in an era
when jurors were ignorant peasants and an elite group (the
lawyers and judges) carefully hand fed them such information as they (the elite) felt the peasants could safely absorb. At the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, De
Tocqueville observed that lawyers had become, in their
eyes at least, a sort of intellectual aristocracy in American
society. At the risk of ruffling the feathers of other members of my chosen profession, I would point out that that
happy social arrangement no longer exists. It is now the
latter portion of the Twentieth Century and while many,
and perhaps most, lawyers and judges still consider themselves an elite corps, any substantial experience on the
trial court level should persuade all but the most barnacleencrusted traditionalist that the average juror today enjoys
5.

Id. at 1000-01, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
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a knowledge, an awareness, a sophistication and in many
cases an education comparable to or superior to that of law
school graduates. It is high time that lawyers and judges
accept the fact that the rest of society is entitled to the
respect and consideration of equals. The mere possession
of an LL.B. or J.D. does not anoint the holder with powers
of discernment not vested in ordinary mortals. Today it
takes a certain effrontery, a certain intellectual arrogance,
a certain intellectual snobbery, to say to a juror, "You
cannot hear this evidence because you are not capable of
effectively evaluating it." Because of a lack of appreciation
of the stability and integrity of the jury system, too much
emphasis is still being put on the danger of prejudicing the
jury by the admission of allegedly improper evidence.'
In the next case, appellants allege prejudicial error due to
the admittance of factually gruesome evidence which they contend "unnecessarily inflame[d] the passion of the jurors. '
Gardner boldly retorts:
[T]wo observations might be made: (1) murder is seldom
pretty, and pictures, testimony and physical evidence in
such a case are always unpleasant; and (2) many attorneys
tend to underestimate the stability of the jury. A juror is
not some kind of a dithering nincompoop, brought in from
never-never land and exposed to the harsh realities of life
for the first time in the jury box. There is nothing magic
about being a member of the bench or bar which makes
these individuals capable of dispassionately evaluating
gruesome testimony which, it is often contended, will
throw jurors into a paroxysm of hysteria. Jurors are our
peers, often as well educated, as well balanced, as stable,
as experienced in the realities of life as the holders of law
degrees. The average juror is well able to stomach the unpleasantness of exposure to the facts of a murder without
being unduly influenced. The supposed influence on jurors
of allegedly gruesome or inflammatory pictures exists more
in the imagination of judges and lawyers than in reality.,
In Carr v. Pacific Telephone Company, Gardner vehemently dissents from the majority's decision to keep out two
items of evidence in a wrongful death action. The first item
concerns the time that defendant spent in jail and the second
6. People v. Johnson, 32 Cal. App. 3d 988, 1003, 109 Cal. Rptr. 118, 127-28 (1973)
(Gardner, P.J., dissenting).
7. People v. Long, 38 Cal. App. 3d 680, 689, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537 (1974).
8. Id. at 689, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 536-37.
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relates to instances of the decedent's derelict behavior as it
affects the measure of damages in the wrongful death action.
Gardner addresses both rulings:
The majority suggests that the jury merely be advised
that the defendant was missing for the years he was in
custody. (On a secret peace mission for the United
Nations? Exploring the upper regions of the Amazon? A
medical missionary in the jungles of New Guinea? A prisoner of war?)
A defendant, even a rich, soulless corporation, is entitled to show the disposition of the decedent to contribute
financially to support his heirs and to show his earning
capacity and his habits of industry and thrift since all have
a bearing on the value of his life to his wife and family. It
the decedent had been a hard-working, law-abiding citizen
and a paragon of all the virtues of honesty, thrift and probity who supported his wife and children and afforded them
a stable home, the plaintiff would be entitled to so prove.
If, in the other hand, he was an irresponsible, philandering, check-kiting jailbird, the jury would be entitled to so
know. The jury is entitled to the whole picture-warts,
wrinkles and all-not a sterilized, unreal, retouched portrait which amounts only to a shadowy silhouette of the
real man.'

Sensitivity to Human Concerns
Throughout his opinions, Gardner exhibits more than just
a gift for articulate speech. The speech is compelling because
it flows from a compassionate soul. Gardner's pathos for his
fellow human being is the endearing quality that underscores
his wit and candor. The following passages exemplify his sensitive concern:
While the speedy disposition of cases is desirable, speed is
not always compatible with justice. Actually, in its use of
courtroom time the present judicial process seems to have
its priorities confused. Domestic relations litigation, one of
the most important and sensitive tasks a judge faces, too
often is given the low-man-on-the-totem-pole treatment,
quite often being fobbed off on a commissioner. One of the
paradoxes of our present legal system is that it is accepted
practice to tie up a court for days while a gaggle of profes9. Carr v. Pacific Tel. Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 537, 547, 103 Cal. Rptr. 120, 127-28
(1972) (Gardner, P.J., dissenting).
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sional medical witnesses expound to a jury on just how
devastating or just how trivial a personal injury may be,
all to the personal enrichment of the trial lawyers involved,
yet at the same time we begrudge the judicial resources
necessary for careful and reasoned judgments in this most
delicate field-the breakup of a marriage with its resulting
trauma and troublesome fiscal aftermath. The courts
should not begrudge the time necessary to carefully go over
the wreckage of a marriage in order to effect substantial
justice to all parties involved. The handling of this case,
which involved the breakup of a 25-year marriage, the custody of 2 teenage girls, the disposition of all of the property
accumulated during that marriage, and the plotting of the
fiscal future of the entire family, is illustrative. Judged by
the brevity of the record, not more than 15 minutes of the
court's time on a busy Friday afternoon short-cause calendar were involved. 0
In the same opinion, Gardner discusses the plight of the
"displaced homemaker."
The new Family Law Act, and particularly Civil Code,
section 4801, has been heralded as a bill of rights for harried former husbands who have been suffering under prolonged and unreasonable alimony awards. However, the
act may not be used as a handy vehicle for the summary
disposal of old and used wives. A woman is not a breeding
cow to be nurtured during her years of fecundity, then
conveniently and economically converted to cheap steaks
when past her prime. If a woman is able to do so, she
certainly should support herself. If, however, she has spent
her productive years as a housewife and mother and has
missed the opportunity to compete in the job market and
improve her job skills, quite often she becomes, when divorced, simply a "displaced homemaker."
A marriage license is not a ticket to a perpetual pension
and, as women approach equality in the job market, the
burden on the husband will be lessened in those cases in
which, by agreement of both parties, the wife has remained
employed or at least has had the opportunity to maintain
and refresh her job skills during marriage. However, in
those cases in which it is the decision of the parties that
the woman becomes the homemaker, the marriage is of
10. In re Marriage of Branter, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 422, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 63839 (1977).
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substantial duration and at separation the wife is to all
intents and purposes unemployable, the husband simply
has to face up to the fact that his support responsibilities
are going to be of extended duration-perhaps for life. This
has nothing to do with feminism, sexism, male chauvinism
or any other trendy social ideology. It is ordinary common
sense, basic decency and simple justice."
In the next excerpt, Gardner ventilates his misgivings
about rehabilitation in the prisons:
For several decades, the Legislature and the courts
operated on the shaky principle that a person could be put
into a cage and there force-fed psychiatrically oriented rehabilitative and therapeutic programs and emerge from
that cage "cured" of his antisocial proclivities. Experience
has finally persuaded us that this is pure balderdash. Nevertheless, mesmerized by this concept, judges throughout
the years have imposed some perfectly ghastly prison sentences on the assumption that rehabilitative programs in
the prison were going to cure or rehabilitate the prisoners.
That philosophy was the basis for the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Under that law, prisoners were sentenced until
"cured."
This is not to say that all of the rehabilitative programs in prison are a waste of time. Far from it. There are
excellent academic programs by which prisoners are exposed to at least the basic tools of education. So, too, are
training programs by which prisoners learn a craft or trade
so that on release they may at least secure and, hopefully,
hold a job."
To which he footnotes:
This court had before it recently a case in which a
normal, run-of-the-mill burglar had been sent to prison.
While in prison, he took a course in welding and learned
how to handle an acetylene torch. On his release, he became a safe burglar. 3
Juvenile Justice
As a trial judge, Gardner served on the juvenile court
bench for a considerable period of time. He gained many in11.
12.
13.

Id. at 419-20, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
People v. Johnson, 82 Cal. App. 3d 183, 186, 147 Cal. Rptr. 55, 57 (1978).
Id. at 186 n.3, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 57 n.3.
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sights from his experience with young people which he has had
occasion to share on the appellate court. In the following opinion, Gardner explains how chronological age does not necessarily coincide with a juvenile's capacity for criminal activity:
As a trial judge, I served six highly educational years
in the juvenile court. One of the first things I learned was
that chronological age is seldom an indication of sophistication nor the experience factor. One 16-year-old may be
callow, unsophisticated, immature. Another may be sophisticated, knowledgeable, savvy and mature. I do not
mean that we should go back to the ancient concept that
children are merely small adults and hold them to the
same standards as adults. (If I had my druthers I would
choose the concept that adults are merely large children.)
But any assumption that the appellant was some kind of
a frightened child by reason of the comparatively short
time that had elapsed between birth and the time he
kicked this two-year-old child to death is simply unrealistic."
In another juvenile case, Gardner discusses the competing
social philosophies that have generated a checker-board of inconsistent and unworkable juvenile court legislation:
The Juvenile Court Law is, and has been, a battleground of divergent and often warring social and legal philosophies. On the one hand, we find those who believe
thoroughly in the parenspatriae philosophy of the original
juvenile court law. On the other hand, we find those who
believe that blind obedience to that philosophy and its
resulting disregard of constitutional rights of young people
has, in many respects, reduced the juvenile court to little
more than a kangaroo court for young people. We also have
a battle to the death between those who, at the risk of
oversimplification, believe in the lock-the-kids-up-andthrow-the-key-away philosophy and those who, again at
the same risk of oversimplification, insist that every underage criminal, no matter how vicious, is but a misguided
child and is to be treated as such. These conflicts have,
from time to time, resulted in a hodge-podge of legislation. 5
Gardner agonizes over one of the more problematic juvenile
14. In re Garth D., 55 Cal. App. 3d 986, 1004, 127 Cal. Rptr. 881, 892 (1976)
(Gardner, P.J., dissenting).
15. In re Ronald S., 69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 868, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (1977).
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statutes that has subsequently been amended by the Legislature. The "601" that he refers to is a juvenile status offender
who Gardner defines as "one whose only offense against society
is doing something that would not be legally prohibited if done
by an adult."' 6 Then he lists examples of those juveniles that
are classified within this section:
(1) The incorrigible ....
(2) The truant.
(3) The curfew violator.
(4)

And that greatest of all catchalls

"...

one who

for any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd
or immoral life." Judicial history does not record that anyone ever beat that rap. A saint would have difficulty avoiding jeopardy under that provision during any given 24-hour
period.
As a result of all of this overbreadth, the juvenile court
often found itself acting as a glorified babysitter, a woefully inadequate substitute parent, a frustrated judicial
truant officer, a reluctant enforcer of curfew laws which
were often of doubtful validity, the involuntary warden of
institutions crammed with fleet-footed but unsuccessful
runaways and the guardian of the sexual mores of a large
group of uncooperative young ladies who allegedly were in
danger of leading idle, lewd, dissolute or immoral lives
when they came into court and were not much better off
when they left.
The 601 was a judicial nightmare. He resented being
in court. He had violated no law. He usually just did not
get along with his parents and when one met the parents,
this was often completely understandable. He was often
severely maladjusted presenting bleak hope of effective
treatment. Just as often he was a time-consuming minor
nuisance some inadequate parent was trying to fob off on
the court. While service in the juvenile court is one of the
most challenging and rewarding of judicial services, it is
often a most frustrating experience-particularly with
601's.,7

The Judicial Opinion
Gardner does not restrict his criticism to drafting mishaps
the
Legislature. He has some disquieting moments with the
of
judicial opinion as well:
16.
17.

Id. at 867 n.1, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 388 n.1.
Id. at 869-70, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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The format our judicial system uses in the creation of
legal principles-the so-called reasoned opinion-lends
itself to nitpicking. An opinion, particularly one which represents a departure from established principles, tends to
become prolix as the court attempts to vindicate or rationalize its new position. Such an opinion becomes a treasure
trove of polemic minutiae embellished with mountains of'
friendly but sometimes redundant authorities. By a careful
and restrictive selection of choice phrases, the opinion can
be used as authority for, and will give aid and comfort to,
almost any given set of facts remotely resembling those on
which the original opinion was based. Theoretically such
an opinion gives us fixed and stable legal principles around
which we can build our lives in what we choose to call an
orderly system. Actually, in the subsequent application we
give to these opinions, we often find ourselves with capricious, erratic, almost whimsical results. Thus, it sometimes becomes necessary to step back from an artful and
microscopic study of the words and phrases in an opinion
in its broad aspect-what was the problem? What was the
solution? 8
Guidance from the Appellate Court
In People v. Lopez, Gardner had occasion to display his
pedagogical talents. The case presented the issue of whether a
defendant on a Farettamotion"9 had freely and knowingly chosen self-representation. In response, Gardner set out clear and
concise guidelines which have endeared him to every trial court
judge ever faced with a Farettamotion. Gardner elucidates the
problem:
In addressing the problem of just what a court should
do in ascertaining that the defendant's election is voluntary and intelligent, we do not wish to appear pedantic.
Neither do we intend to establish any horrendously complex or rigid standards . . . . Rather, in the somewhat
wistful hope that some trial judges may read this opinion,
we will set forth certain suggestions on how to protect the
record when a defendant chooses to go it alone. After all,
in spite of the lofty historical and intellectual approach of
Faretta, those with trial experience are quite aware that
every prospective pro. per. is not necessarily sincerely convinced that his decision to represent himself is going to
18.
19.

In re Moore, 45 Cal. App. 3d 285, 287, 119 Cal. Rptr. 356, 357 (1975).
See Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

A GALLERY OF GARDNER

1979]

assure him of a trial more fair than if he were represented
by a skilled, and experienced professional. Whether the
prospective pro. per. is a naive character who sincerely
believes he can represent himself better than can a lawyer,
a cagey loser who is going to try to reduce the trial to a
shambles in the hope that somehow reversible error will
creep in, a free soul with a touch of ham, or simply someone who wants to have some fun with the judicial establishment, the trial judge must recognize that the first
ground on appeal is probably going to be that the defendant was allowed to represent himself without having intelligently and voluntarily made that decision. Such are
the facts of life."0
COMIC RELIEF
Poking Fun in Dissent
There are roguish moments when Gardner is struck by the
folly of his colleagues' legal analysis and results. Under these
circumstances his quips are more often found in the dissent:
It is clear that the thing that really sticks in the craw
of the majority is that the defendant has been convicted
of first degree murder for simply pushing an old lady. I
must admit that Mrs. Smith, at age 79, probably did not
have too many years to live and that the defendant is
probably a normal, well-adjusted, well-intentioned, strong
arm robber who had no intention of hurting the old lady,
let alone kill her. I'll further admit that the vagaries of our
law are such that some odd legal results come from some
similar physical acts. Leaving out the robbery, but assuming the death resulted from the pushing, if the defendant
knocked Mrs. Smith down because he did not like her, that
would, generally speaking, be murder. If he knocked her
down just for the hell of it, that would, generally speaking,
be manslaughter. If he knocked her down accidentally,
that would, generally speaking, be no crime at all. But
whatever the courts may think of any extension of the
felony-murder rule, the Legislature had made one thing
very clear in Penal Code, section 187. One may rob, burgle,
rape, burn, maim or molest and only suffer the consequences of that crime as set forth in the particular code
section. If, however, during the perpetration of one of those
offenses, the victim dies, then, to quote a recent deathless
20.

People v. Lopez, 71 Cal. App. 3d 568, 571-72, 138 Cal. Rptr. 36, 38 (1977).
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line from Telly Savalas in Kojak, "That's murder one,
baby.""'
Gardner's dissent in Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital takes
aim at his brethren for misconstruing a California Supreme
Court holding:
Here, I pause to express an admiration amounting
almost to awe at the remarkable job that the majority has
done on Madden. From my lowly place in the judicial
pecking order, I have chafed from time to time at some of
the opinions of our Supreme Court. Nevertheless, I never
had the intestinal fortitude, let alone the skill or ability,
to completely emasculate one. This, the majority has done
to Madden. As it turns out, dissenting Justice Mosk (with
a leg up from Professor Henderson) won this race going
away and the majority were simply left at the starting
gate. Justice Tobriner who wrote the majority opinion
might just as well have stayed home that day."2
In Filitti v. Superior Court, Gardner chides the majority
for their decision to overrule the trial court on a search and
seizure issue:
I cannot accept as reasonable the majority's holding
that the activities of the defendant were so consistent with
innocence as to overrule the trial court's finding that the
officer reasonably had a strong suspicion of criminal activity. The majority suggests that the bundle put into the
engine compartment could have contained rags, tools or a
battery. In the first place, the storage compartment of a
Volkswagen (and a Karmann Ghia) is in the other end of
the vehicle. There is no place in the engine compartment
of-a Volkswagen product to store rags, tools, or a battery.
A battery is kept under the seat in a Karmann Ghia. Insofar as the battery is concerned, it weighs between 35 and
40 pounds as contrasted with the approximately 4 pounds
of a kilo of marijuana. The difference in appearance between a man carrying a battery and a man carrying two
kilos of marijuana is a difference between a man carrying
a fifth of bourbon and a case of bourbon. And, in addition,
I would point out that few people keep rags, tools or batteries buried in their backyard.
21. People v. Morales, 49 Cal. App. 3d 134, 148-49, 122 Cal. Rptr. 157, 166 (1975)
(Gardner, P.J., dissenting).
22. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 376, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775,
795 (1976) (Gardner, P.J., dissenting).
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Of course, the package could have contained something else than kilos of marijuana. It could have contained
powdered rhinoceros horn, dried cow bezoar, Howard
Hughes' Autobiography-or Mr. Justice Peters' famous
cookies. . . . Frankly, between these choices, I would vote
for the latter. After all what better place to keep cookies
23
warm than in the engine compartment?
Skill at "One-Liners"
A short Gardner remark, often placed in a footnote, causes
a reader to chuckle and give at least brief thought to how
adroitly the legal community can make a relatively simple situation seem ponderous and of insurmountable proportions.
The situation: a habeas corpus petition where the Attorney General contended that petitioner had been unduly dilatory in presenting his claim of error. Gardner's comment:
Petitioner's delay has kept him in the penitentiary for an
extra two years. It is difficult to conceive where the rights
of the People have been harmed by his lack of diligence-unless they intend to sue him for the reasonable
24
cost of his room and board during that time.
Regarding a remand to the trial court for what Gardner
considers a moot hearing on the issue of prejudice, the Justice
footnotes:
Certain pragmatic considerations militate against this action. Petitioner has now been paroled. It would be an unconscionable waste of time of everyone-the petitioner
(who has returned to his normal pursuits and, hopefully
some kind of steady employment, assuming he has not
skipped again), the trial court, the district attorney, the
Attorney General, the Adult Authority and this court
should another appeal ensue. We feel that everyone involved could make more productive use of his time than
debating the possibility of prejudice in the life of Edward
M. Morales by the unexplained delay of five months in
prison. The idea of such a hearing in this case smacks too
much of the alleged practice of medieval monks sitting
around their cells endlessly debating how many angels
could sit on the head of a pin.2
23. Filitti v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 930, 939, 100 Cal. Rptr. 583, 589
(1972) (Gardner, P.J., dissenting).
24. In re Bartlett, 15 Cal. App. 3d 176, 186, 93 Cal. Rptr. 96, 103 (1971).
25. In re Morales, 43 Cal. App. 3d 243, 252 n.5, 117 Cal. Rptr. 645, 651 n.5 (1974).
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In a footnoted commentary on standardized, massproduced, and adhesive contracts, Gardner laments that in
spite of judicial concern,
[C]ontracts of adhesion, most of which are editorial
nightmares, proliferate. There is a dark suspicion that the
same people who prepare these prepare income tax forms
and directions as to how to put together packaged Christmas toys.2
Justice Gardner describes a criminal fact situation with
apparent glee:
Officer Hamann of the Santa Ana Police Department
heard the broadcast and responded to the apartment complex on South Fairview Street. He was briefed on the direction the suspects had taken. He was told by a security
guard that he, the security guard, had chased one of the
suspects along the building and saw someone leaping the
fence at the southwest corner of the building. He, the security guard, stayed there and did not see anyone leave. Officer Hamann then peeked over that fence into an apartment backyard. He saw that a screen door had been torn
away from a sliding glass door of an apartment. Officer
Hamann went over the fence, approached the sliding glass
door and opened it two or three inches to establish that it
was not locked. He looked through the kitchen window and
saw the defendant and another black man sitting on a sofa
watching television. He opined that this was somewhat
unusual in light of the fact that shots had been fired, sirens
were wailing, a large number of officers were in the area
yelling back and forth and patting-down individuals in the
apartment complex. Still, these two were watching TV.
They were either stone deaf or it was a remarkably absorbing television program.27
An evidentiary issue prompts Justice Gardner to footnote
a tongue-in-cheek eulogy for the doctrine of res gestae:
However, the new Evidence Code, modern writers and
modern courts have abandoned the use of this rather illdefined phrase. Res gestae has now gone the way of the
great auk, the passenger pigeon and high button shoes. It
was, in its time, a handy gadget. When an attorney could
26. Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 974 n.1, 119 Cal. Rptr. 171,
173 n.1 (1975).
27. People v. Benton, 77 Cal. App. 3d 322, 325, 142 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1978).
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think of no other reason for the introduction of hearsay, he
would simply utter the magic words "res gestae" and,
often as not, get the testimony in."8
CONCLUSION

Justice Gardner's importance transcends his humor and
his ability to turn a good phrase. There is a warm-hearted spirit
and high-principled purpose directing the words he writes. The
cynical edge that can be detected in his frank and open manner
reflects his frustration when bad laws engender hardship. Yet,
Gardner braves the constellation of human inequities that besiege the judiciary with courage and conviction. His deep respect for the intelligence of the jury, his sensitive performance
of difficult judicial tasks, and his strong sense of common decency and simple justice reflect his faith in the intrinsic worth
of humankind.
28.
(1978).
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